

THE GERMAN PEOPLE

TESTIMONY
OF
MR. EMIL LUDWIG
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE GERMAN PEOPLE

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FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1943

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m. Hon. Sol Bloom, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order. Members of the committee, I have the great honor to present to you Mr. Emil Ludwig, who is going to speak off or on the record. We have a stenographer here, Mr. Wadsworth, and we are going to take everything down and see what we want to do with it afterward. Mr. Ludwig tells me that anything he says can go on the record.

STATEMENT OF EMIL LUDWIG

Mr. LUDWIG. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, this oval table at which I have the honor to sit for the first time has a great symbolic meaning to us in Europe, because we know that over this table was signed the declaration of war at the time of Mr. Wilson's administration, which decided the path of our destiny. And we looked over the 3,000 miles that separate Europe and America, and visualized the mystic place where all this happened and the kind of men who made it happen.

I want to speak about the Germans and German psychology. It is the only thing that I should talk about here, as in all other things you yourselves know better than I do what to consider; but I can speak on this subject, as I was born in Germany, and lived there in my youth, like my ancestors.

Before I begin, let me say that a certain mood of revenge and hatred which is found sometimes in emigrants is not to be found in my spirit. I left Germany when I was 25 years old, without any persecution or necessity for leaving. My family were German Jews, they occupied prominent positions. I did not suffer any injury, but even boyish as I was, I wanted more liberty than I could enjoy in that country. The Nazis did not take anything from me, and as I am a Swiss citizen and have my home in Switzerland, the fall of the Nazis cannot bring any material benefit to me. So I am in a certain sense independent, and can look at the Nazis objectively, as if I were speaking in the year 2000.

On the other hand, I returned every year as a visitor to Germany, and I have written a series of books on German subjects. Half of them are full of criticisms, of Bismarck and William II and Hindenburg. Those books have gone all over the world. The other half of the series deal with Goethe, Beethoven, and the great German thinkers, for whom I observed deep reverence. So I have lived in my life and work in the two Germanys about which I wish to speak to you.

I want to tell you and prove to you why the defeat of Germany is nearer than you think, and what to do with the Germans after their defeat.

How is it possible, everyone outside of Germany asks, that the same country and same people that created Goethe and Beethoven and Kant, and all those great inventors, poets, and thinkers of Germany, should always fall back into a period of barbarism and wars? The reason is that state and mind, intelligence and government, have been separated for the past 500 years in Germany, and never did work together as in other countries.

In your country Jefferson and Franklin were allowed to write books, and yet they took part in governing the country. In Germany, as you know, the Junkers for the past 300 years have held the leading posts in the military field and in the state, both in Prussia and then in the Empire. But the common people, as the non-Junker population might be called, were excluded from government and also barred from commanding military positions. Accordingly they went into business and also entered the field of science or philosophy. And the interesting point is that these common people, or "bourgeois," did not resent the arrangement. The philosophers and writers lived as it were on a dreamy island, writing their ideas, and as the ship of state passed them by they saluted it and said: "It's a good thing that we are not responsible for the state."

That is the reason why Germany is the only country in Europe which has not had a successful revolution in all her history. No one from the nobility has ever helped to build the true greatness of Germany as civilization knows Germany; no Bismarck, no Frederick the Great. On the other hand hardly anybody from the bourgeoisie up to 1920 has ever been deciding in German governmental positions; in the military two or three. The two men of culture during the last 200 years who tried their hand in government—Goethe and W. von Humboldt—gave it up as a bad job. They saw that it was impossible to govern Germany by intelligence and culture. It must be done by guns and the compulsion of obedience. The uniform is the adored symbol. You may recall that when Mr. von Bethmann Hollweg was required by his official duty to declare war, in August 1914, it was necessary for him to be made a colonel overnight, so that he could appear before the Reichstag in uniform.

I have to combat two errors about Germany which I find in this country, both coming from the best old puritan tradition which feels sympathy for the under dog. One of these errors is found in the remark we hear so often in this country: "Oh, the Germans are good people—very good people; but they have bad leaders." Is not a man responsible for his wife? When she becomes bad, then he can and should divorce her. The Germans never divorced from any of their princes. They remained obedient to their leader. It is a prime error to say that you are fighting the Nazis, and not the German people.

The other error is the popular belief in the United States that the Treaty of Versailles was a "slave treaty" and that Versailles created Hitler. I contend that Versailles was a lucky surprise for the beaten Germans and not by any means the source of the Hitler movement. If there had not been at the head of this Government, by chance, a humanist and philanthropist like Wilson—if another kind of charac-

ter had acted for the United States at Versailles, the Germans would not have received the Rhine, and the peace would have been what Clemenceau wanted. Perhaps that would have been a better solution.

Germany did not ask for the armistice because of Wilson's 14 points, as the Germans pretend in their histories. It was asked for because the Germans were terribly defeated, after 4 years of war. It was not a people's revolution in Germany that ended the war, but a revolution concocted by the generals, 2 months before the strike by sailors in the German Navy. General Ludendorff, and with him Hindenburg, declared like a gambler, "My play is lost. I cannot continue. I must have an armistice within 24 hours."

It is of interest to note that the break in German nerves, which is characteristic of the Germans—and you will see this break-down of nerves repeated in a short time—occurred so suddenly and so completely that the Germans suffered their defeat deep in the territory of the enemy. They had in their grasp, together with their allies, nearly as much territory as they hold today. Yet, within 24 hours, the German high command collapsed so completely that it would not even attempt to shift its forces back to Germany before asking for terms. The German generals did not have the courage to go back within the boundaries of Germany, and they evaded the responsibility for doing so.

The Treaty of Versailles contained some ethnic errors, and it was faulty also in not fixing the figure of Germany's reparation debt. But it did provide for plebiscites, which was a new feature, adopted at the suggestion of the Americans. In any case the Germans remain the only nation who gained some money by the First World War. They paid 4.4 billions of dollars, but they received 6.4 billions as loans, which were never paid back.

The great mistake at Versailles went much deeper than these errors. It was a mistake in the psychology of the Germans. The Allies believed that the Germans would become liberal and set up a democratic state overnight, without previous education and without tradition. The Allies took some territory from the Germans, but left them complete freedom. Later they relaxed the rigors of the treaty, and made it milder every 5 years. The great Briand, who was an idealist, failed also in his attempt to understand German psychology. When he gave the Rhineland freedom 5 years before the treaty provided, a so-called liberal said to me, "Now, you see, they are cowards, the French!"

The Germans do not understand anybody who says, "We want to make a gentleman's agreement." The word "gentleman," like the word "fair," is always used in its English form by Germans. They have no equivalent words in their rich language. They love order and uniformity. They are the only people in modern history who have a passion for obedience. Others, like Americans for example, obey when it is necessary, when there is war, but the typical German wants to obey because he loves to be ordered. He loves compliance better than he loves liberty.

Mr. JOHNSON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. If you don't mind, Mr. Ludwig would prefer to finish his statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. I was going to supplement what he said about obeying. A native German, but now an American citizen, once told me the secret of the German character is obedience.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is what I am saying.

Mr. JOHNSON. They believe in obedience. I just wanted to supplement what you said.

Mr. LUDWIG. Absolutely. It was very easy for the United States and the Allies to mistake German character in 1919, because we mistook it, too. I was not a minister nor a Congressman, but I wrote the books which helped form public opinion. Yes; we ourselves made a mistake. We thought the other Germany of the thinkers, the idealists, and the liberals could come into power. It was fated that Germans should not fight for their so-called Republic, but should receive it passively. The German "revolution" consisted of the fact that 22 German princes ran away. There was a hiatus, and then some poor, inexperienced Liberals and Socialists were forced by the cowardice of the Junkers to steer the ship of state. There was no leadership, no color, no enthusiasm. Nobody took command to bark out orders. So the German people felt sorry for themselves. Hitler is quite right when he declared that the German people are not prepared for democracy. They had been educated for 300 years to take orders from military bosses. Their right to equality in voting dated back only to 1867, while Americans had voted for a hundred years and Englishmen more than 200.

The new Republic in Germany was based on humanity and freedom, and the Germans found it terribly dull. They were afraid of responsibility, never having exercised it. They were troubled by the new liberty. They did not understand universal equality. They disliked the Weimar constitution, and boycotted it. Please remember that the first political murders in Germany following the World War were committed 10 years before the Nazis were organized. They were made in 1920 and 1922, when my great friend Rathenau, whose name I have the honor to pronounce at this table, was murdered; and the other Reichminister, Erzberger, and three others were murdered at the beginning of the Republic. These murders were symbolic of hatred of the republican regime. Nobody liked the Republic. Popular feeling was on the side of the murderers. People of culture and education, professors and sometimes whole universities joined in the well-nigh universal hymns of hate and revenge. Some of my old friends, at first liberals, became nationalistic in the sinister sense. You will find that in every country, after its defeat, the opposition becomes more and more nationalistic.

So unpopular was the new Republic, so weak and lacking in power to rule the people, that its flag had to be actually covered with linen when brought to a convention on parade, because of the danger of insults from the crowd. The very word "republic" was hated. The Germans devised the word "Reich" in its place, and "Reich" it is today.

There were never any enemy soldiers in Germany during the war, except during the first weeks in a corner of the country; so the people got the idea that Germany was never beaten. "We were not defeated in the war," they said. "We were betrayed, not beaten. The Socialists and Jews stabbed us in the back."

The timidity of the new republican leaders encouraged the anti-republican feeling. It was a farce, when the two generals responsible for the German debacle appeared before the Congress, to see the leaders give them bouquets of flowers, as if to say: "We love you." All the old, reactionary officials remained at their posts, especially those of the

nobility; and of course the new liberal ministers, nominally in control, were actually unable to put their will into execution.

The Reichwehr—that was the new German Army—was the national anchor, the only one that evoked patriotic enthusiasm, and it was led by the old-time Junkers, as it always has been. The treaty allowed to Germany 100,000 soldiers, but within a few years these soldiers multiplied like rabbits into a million. They were not called an army, but they were there. Unlike the scions of the royal house of France, who were banned and for a century could not come back, the German crown prince was allowed to come back shortly after his flight to Holland, because the Republic was palpably weak and no liberal dares in Germany to stop a prince.

Then came the first election. And what did the Germans do, intelligent people as they undoubtedly are? For the first time in their life they were electing their own leader. Whom did they choose? They could have made a selection from many men of brains, experience, and qualities of leadership. But instead, they chose the nearly 80-year-old Field Marshal Hindenburg, who had no other merit than that he had lost a world war. In America, as in Germany, he was greatly overrated. When I was here in 1928, for instance, a very prominent American said to me: "Hindenburg is the pride of the fatherland. We believe he is the best man to head their government." Just so, only yesterday, they said the same thing of Petain.

The old marshal declared two things: That he was a monarchist and that he never read a book except a military one. This made a hit with the German people. "He is our father," they said, "he is our new king. He is a marvelous man with a great moustache and very bright red stripes on his trousers."

This old man, the first President elected by the German people, made the statement that the Kaiser was entitled to be paid back his millions. He also invented the lie that the war was not lost by himself, but by the "stab in the back" by the Socialists and Jews. But the liberals and even the Socialists were so full of the German feeling for revenge and for building up military power that they voted for a new fleet, although for 50 years the Socialists had been opposed to military expansion.

Not in Versailles, gentlemen, but in Berlin the Weimar Republic was lost. It was lost not by the violence of a dictator but by the soul of the German people, who are not educated to become democratic. It is not in their make-up to sense equality. Their conception of the state is a pyramid. Every man is a stone in this pile. He wants to be as high as possible. He bears the weight of the man above him, because he is allowed to put his foot down on the man beneath him. That is why the German is obedient. It is a part of his nature. It explains the excellent organization in Germany. If a German can see the boots of the Kaiser or Fuehrer at the top of the pyramid he is happy.

In every country the wizard is critical about his own nation. But in no other nation the thinkers spoke so bitterly about their country. The greatest German that ever lived, Goethe, said between many other ironic words:

Germany is nothing, but the individual German is a great deal, and yet Germans believe exactly the reverse. * * * I have often suffered bitterly at the thought of the German Nation, so worthy of respect individually and so wretched

as a whole. A comparison between Germany and other nations awakens painful feelings, which I try to escape as best I can; in science and in art I have found the wings with which I can lift myself above them.

I came here to make a lecture tour and spoke of nothing else than liberal ideas and philosophies. I advocated a European understanding. The German Ambassador gave me something to eat and some water—it was during the time of prohibition—and he received a bitter letter from the Foreign Office at Berlin asking why he received a man who had written that the Germans, among others, were responsible for the war of 1914. We and my friends were a very small minority, trying to use our intelligence to save what we could, to save the German Republic in the sense in which it was founded.

Such a situation constitutes an ideal field for a resolute adventurer. They say in America that unemployment made Hitler. Had you not the same unemployment? The Germans enjoyed prosperity, the same as the Americans, from 1925 to 1928. You had the same workless and unemployment period from 1929 to 1931. You had 10,000,000 workless men and Germany had 5,000,000. If unemployment was the reason for Hitler's rise, why did you not have fascism here, as Germany had?

The answer lies in this: When the visitor arrives in your country his first sight is the Goddess of Liberty, and when he first visits Berlin he sees the "Sieges-allee"—that is, the 24 Hohenzollerns in marble uniforms, of whom 2 or 3 had some merit and the others none. In America the first symbol viewed is that of liberty. In Germany it is that of military force. In America all is allowed that is not expressly verboten. In Germany all is verboten which is not expressly allowed. When I went this morning to the post office the clerk said to me, "Fine weather." If you should say "fine weather" to the postman in Germany he would reply: "There is no weather. There are stamps here." This is because every employee in Germany is a military man. Anyone who has been in Germany knows that this is not an overstatement.

Once in Berlin I was at a loss as to my direction and asked a policeman where to go. He said: "First three blocks right, then left where there is a church; then right again, and then you are there." I said "Thank you." He replied, roughly: "You need not thank me. Repeat what I said."

In Berlin, even in deep peacetime, the main street is enlivened at noon by military columns, doing the goose step, going through Unter den Linden. Everybody is delighted. Here, to my great astonishment, I saw not a single soldier outside this Capitol, which now, in the midst of a great war, seems to me the nerve center of the world. Yesterday in front of the White House there was one lonely soldier coming and going, and there were two secret service men at the door. I could hear a Strauss waltz coming over their little radio.

This illustrates the difference between Germans and Americans, difference by their antecedents, their upbringing, and their psychology. The militaristic, subservient, compliant German is so steeped in the tradition of blind obedience to authority that you cannot change him. Here you can laugh with and exchange banter with your President, but you cannot do that with any policeman in Germany.

The uniform is exceptional here, but it is the great ideal in Germany, and has been for 200 years. Every girl had only one dream,

and that was to have a sweetheart in uniform. What a happy day for the Germans when finally there came a Hitler, a man who brought back to them brass music, orders, uniforms, goose steps, a boss with a voice that ordered. That was what they liked. Here was a man who brought them even riding boots, although they had no horses to ride. When you see one day every bank clerk in riding boots and you ask one why this is so he replies: "My Fuehrer is today in Nuremberg. I come in riding boots." That is the mentality. It is not a thing that can be rubbed out.

Then Hitler brought them the fresh vision of world domination, that old mystic phrase which, you remember, prevailed throughout the medieval period of German history and lies deep in German mentality. The Germans understand a ruler who uses only one word of philosophy, also if it is an empty phrase. They like to have their cannons made of 95 percent steel, copper, and nickel, and 5 percent philosophy. They must have the music of world domination—Wagner. On May 1, 1933, Hitler shouted to 100,000 persons in Tempelhof, asking for Gehorsam (obedience). He shouted this word three times altogether, and I heard on the radio the thundering applause that greeted him. From that moment the Germans began to love their Fuehrer. So they welcomed him with cheers. Even the Socialists had failed to fight for the Republic.

When the Kaiser and the princes fled three German officers—I know their names—fought and died to protect the imperial flag. Yet not one German workman died for the Republic in 1932 when Von Papen dissolved the Government of Prussia. Their love of submission to authority was greater than their love of liberty. The German likes to die for the fatherland, but not to think for it. It is easy for him to obey someone else, but it nearly kills him to stand erect as an individual, or to act on his own initiative. A man with a voice like a certain American President, whose modulated speech over the radio appeals to anybody, would be impossible in Germany. There they do not like persuasion. They love a man that barks. Of him they say, "That must be a strong man!" I saw in my youth intelligent and liberal scientists thrilled to hear the Kaiser speaking, with his penetrant sergeant's voice.

In a moral and legal sense Hitler is the true symbol of the present German Nation. He was elected in the most democratic way. No President ever came to this hill with a better legal claim to his office than Mr. Hitler had when he went into office in January 1933. He was elected chief of the strongest party, and just as King George designated Mr. Churchill as head of the British Cabinet, so President Hindenburg named Hitler as Chancellor. Later Hitler received 99 percent of the votes in several plebiscites. It is clear that there were also fraudulent ballots, but not 99 percent. He was still the expression of the will of the nation. This man was more frank than any other candidate in making known his program. He wrote a big book in which every German was advised of Hitler's proposals. In that book he outlined his idea of world domination, the Great War, the persecution of the Jews, and the difference between the two classes of citizens. The whole nation, with the exception of a negligible minority, was delighted to find finally a new boss.

Where, in those times, was the Germany of Goethe? Our books

were burnt in May 1933. My books were given a special place of honor—I was burned between Heine and Spinoza. These books were burned; not only by the S. S. men but by thousands of students of the universities, who had eagerly read them only a short time before.

Of course, there are exceptions among the Germans, such as Niemoller. But even a man like Niemoller, who is surely a martyr, even a man like that could say, according to an American who told me what Niemoller said to him just before he became a prisoner: "If there should be a war against France I would go at once."

MR. WADSWORTH. Who was the leader you mentioned?

MR. LUDWIG. Niemoller; you know his name.

THE CHAIRMAN. To go against France?

MR. LUDWIG. Fighting, as a lieutenant.

THE CHAIRMAN. With the Germans?

MR. LUDWIG. With the Germans, of course. He is anti-Hitler in matters of conscience, but he said, "If we have a war against France I shall go at once." The fact that a man is anti-Hitler is by no means a guaranty of his loyalty—even abroad. Niemoller's case shows how even the best men in Germany are full of revenge.

The barbaric acts of the Nazis were not, of course, approved by all Germans. There were some thousands, perhaps even millions, who were against the acts of barbarism. But who really opposed it? Who rose against Hitlerism? Only a few pastors protested, as against the millions who applauded. It was not the Nazis alone who exiled the Jews—it was the great majority of the German people. We have thousands of eye-witness reports telling how German citizens, men and women, of their own free will, without any urging or official inducement, helped the storm troopers to hunt down, whip, and kill the Jews. A small minority of the people remained passive and indifferent. Nearly the whole nation cooperated with the Nazis. The whole nation is responsible for the brutalities of the last 10 years.

The Germans can show that they were not responsible for William II. They can say, "We inherited this man." Later, when the republic failed, they could say, "We did not know how to govern. We were not educated." But they have no excuse for Hitler. They saw his program, they knew what to expect; and they elected him by an enormous majority and they have stood by him ever since. Now the old Puritan spirit in this country, this traditional sympathy for the weak, offers to excuse Germany. You like to say that these brutalities are perpetrated only by the Nazis; that the German people are not to blame.

May I tell you that Germany has in the maximum 800,000 S. S. men and 15,000,000 soldiers? Some of those 15,000,000 Germans are seen in the pictures, and you have authentic reports of their brutalities. Who were those pilots dive bombing over France, killing fleeing women and children? Who torpedoed hospital ships? Who killed 300 children in the little town of Bath, in England, knowing the children were the target? Who devastated Lidice, in Czechoslovakia? It was the average German soldier, who is a cross-section of his people, just as your soldiers are a cross-section of the American people.

The interesting point is that it is not a perversity that animates those Germans. The word "sadism" may be rightly applied sometimes to individuals, like Hitler or Heydrich, but no nation is sadistic. It is a perverted idealism that moves these men—the religion

of violence. They have been educated in this by German books since before Hegel's time, for a hundred years. The Attorney General of Nazi Germany hit the nail on the head when he said, "Right is what is good for Germany." Other peoples have been cruel in their wars—we know that; but they did not make a religion of cruelty and barbarity. They did not say, "We are dominators of the world, and whatever is advantageous for us is right." "The Germans are in love with death," said Clemenceau; indeed they like all that is tragic. This is the main difference with the American observation.

This is but another example of the philosophy of Germany. They know what they are doing. So, if they are responsible as a nation, they must be punished.

Now I come to my conclusion. Allow me to say something which I cannot prove, but which I know from my analysis of the German character. I feel sure that Mr. Hitler will be assassinated soon, by his own men, probably by the Junkers, because the Junkers have always been traitors to their kings. When a conqueror ceases to gain great victories they leave him at that moment. As Napoleon said once, "A legal king can lose one battle after another; but I am a conqueror. I cannot afford to lose even one." And when he lost one he lost all.

There are good reasons to foresee at the same time as the death of Hitler, and with the same symptoms, the break of nerves which you saw in October 1918. Their strong German Army, with their allies, had taken Jerusalem, Belgium, the Ukraine, and so on, and stood practically where it stands today, yet the break-down took place within 24 hours. A similar break is even more probable today, by reason of stronger influences. They have been incessantly engaged for the last 10 years in war work, and not merely 4 years. There is the question of fatigue. The second point is that they are not defending a dynasty. After all, there was a motive to spur them on until 1918, since the dynasty had existed for 400 years.

The greatest element to force a break-down, however, is the new weapon employed against them—the air bombardment, which to me is the second front. It is the vertical second front from above. The attempt to draw an analogy between the Germans and the British is all wrong. The English and German characters are entirely different. The English character, as you know, is stubborn. When an Englishman is attacked and bombarded he stiffens his resistance and says, "I will stick here 10 years. I will not run away." His sense of responsibility, even his inborn irony, strengthen his resolve. He has been educated in that direction, even in his games, where fair play is the basic rule.

In Germany there never was fair play. Prince Bulow gives astonishing examples of this fact in his German memoirs; the German Count Kessler, too. There is discipline and obedience, but no disposition to deal generously or fairly with an opponent. So every German feels that an opponent will not deal fairly with him when he is overcome. Bismarck, who knew his Germans, said: "The German has no civil courage." He is an excellent soldier; but when you find him without a uniform, with no boss, no colonel to direct him, and he stands in Cologne or Essen, where great bombardments hammer him, you see him losing his nerve.

Air bombing, I think, is the deciding factor that will break the Germans. If all production here were concentrated in planes, and all

training in pilots, and we had gasoline enough, there would be a very quick end of the German war. After 20 days and nights of total bombardment they would break down completely. You know, much better than I do, the extent and variety of the technical weapons that you are producing with a miraculous speed. Also for these we emigrants are deeply grateful to America. There is no more doubt about victory. But the other part of the picture is the question of early break-down of German nerves, which can be accomplished best by air bombardment. A very high-ranking American told me yesterday that, in his opinion, there would not be a horizontal invasion of Germany. But he also did think a vertical invasion was the thing to do.

What we fear is what will happen on the day after the death of Hitler. The Junkers, the generals, will kowtow to you and say, "We love the Americans. We do not hate the Jews. We don't ask for colonies. Come, let us be brothers again." After this bad man is not there, and the Junkers make you any kind of friendly offer, I fear that certain elements in this country, and even in this House, would say, "Now let us make peace and let us finish up this business. They are good people, those generals."

Gentlemen, they are not! They are not one whit better than the Hitlers. They have merely better manners. They are culpable exactly as the Nazis. Why did they give in to Hitler's plans, which he would never have realized with an opposed general staff? Because he gave them back their positions, power, and money, but, most of all, because they dreamed of revenge and accepted this little Austrian proletarian, whom they despise, because he alone had the popular appeal. The generals, the symbols of German war-will, must be destroyed. As long as they are there every German boy will dream of revenge.

After victory, the question is, what to do with the German nation. There must be no brutal revenge, after the Hitler fashion. Two plans are suggested, in your country. Neither of them is acceptable, in my opinion. One of them is the proposal to send the Germans to the Upper Nile, or to sterilize their men, destroy all factories, and force them to raise potatoes in Germany. I was astonished to hear one of your great writers, a liberal man who had been with Loyalist Spain, repeat this nonsense. You would not destroy the German factories, and you cannot destroy 70 million people. You cannot transport them overseas. You cannot sterilize a nation. You cannot enslave a people, even for the sake of punishing them for starting and carrying on a war of brutality.

The second proposal emanating from the United States is this: "Give the poor misguided Germans their own freedom back again. They are innocent. They will make a better republic now." Of course, there is no discussion of the matter of physical punishment for the Nazi leaders. Everybody agrees that they must be punished; not twenty of them, perhaps thousands. But in dealing with a nation of 70,000,000 people, let me remind you that we have had for 150 years, since Beccaria, a new philosophy of penal law. We do not punish any more for revenge. For 100 years we have confined the criminal, first for the security of society; and second, to educate him and thus bring about his reform. This policy must be applied to the German nation, which is responsible for this crime against the world. The security of society will be achieved, of course, by disarmament of the

Germans; but this must be much more thorough than before. It must be a disarmament in which even the pistol in the belt of a policeman cannot be left in German hands.

Now, as to education and government. This education cannot be imparted to the Germans by three or four thousand American teachers, who would speak to the German children just as colorfully as I speak English. Every boy and girl in Germany would laugh. No; the Allied Nations should send several hundred men over to Germany, to all universities and all schools, to supervise the books and lessons, and to root out the perverted instruction that destroyed the character of German youth by instilling ideas of revenge, violence, and aggression into them. When a school director in Baden introduced my book on William II in 1926, he was removed.

It is impossible, moreover, to begin with a new Congress or Reichstag in Germany. There are no liberals in Germany strong enough to lead. It is a human error on the part of many emigrants from Germany, who do not share my ideas, to say: "We shall go back and make a liberal Germany." It was impossible the first time. How can I think after this new outburst that the Germans can, overnight, become democrats? Is there a democratic lymph which you can inject, and thus immunize the subject against militarism, world domination schemes, and the passion of submission to superiors in uniform? Such a serum has not yet been invented.

Here is a deciding difference to Italy. Owing to the numerous republics on Italian soil that existed in their history of 2,000 years, the Italians possess a tradition of democracy. In the nineteenth century they fought for 40 years to conquer their liberty. Whereas the German liberals, at the same time, remained vague idealists who left it to the Junker, Bismarck, to create unity and their "Reich," the Italians gained their liberty through the revolutionary spirit of Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour.

Mussolini interrupted a centuries-old tradition of democracy, Hitler only an intermezzo of 14 years which had set in after the defeat of 1918. Mussolini found no modern example for his tyranny and had to go back to the Roman Empire for his ideals. Hitler continued a 300-year-old tradition of military autocracy in Prussia. Therefore, today all parties and classes in Italy are looking back to their former liberty and may produce a leader for tomorrow. The Germans have no name or epoch to revive; the Weimar Republic, that never took up arms to defend itself, has left no hope, only contempt in the people. That is why Italy will be able to govern herself after the defeat, Germany not.

These contrasts are due to differences of character. The boot-shaped peninsula has lived to see a hundred wars, and yet, after the Roman Empire, no Italian prince or Pope aspired world domination, because it is alien to Italian feelings.

For many centuries Italy has been the object for German mystic world domination. Although of the same density of population and poorer than Germany in raw materials, the Italian people never desired the conquest of France, Switzerland, Serbia, or Greece. The desire to conquer and dominate their neighbors is deep in the warlike souls of the Germans today as in the times of Tacitus. The Italians fought wars for trade and freedom, the Germans for conquest. The Italians suffer their present dictator, the Germans adore theirs.

Fascism in the hands of the peace-loving Italian people during a period of 17 years never became a world danger, but as soon as it was transplanted to the war-loving German people it became a menace.

Tomorrow, after the victory, the Italian people will not rise to use their arms against the victors, but in the Germans the feeling for revenge will be as strong in their hearts in 1945 as it was in 1920.

Among the emigrants from Germany are noble, sincere men. Others, who undertake now under their well-known names to guarantee you a new liberal Germany, wrote the most militaristic of books during the last war, or prepared the "revanche" against France under the mask of rapprochement. Others merely desire their old homes and old jobs, or seek to become ministers. Others held places in government during the republic, and failed to stop fascism; and now they tell you that it was merely an adventurer who came by chance and overthrew the peaceful German people. A farmer-labor minister of the Weimar Republic has dared in these days, when thousands of young Americans are being killed, because the German people wanted revenge to declare publicly that the average German lad excels the American. This he declared, although a guest in this country.

Between the two possibilities which I see, one is that Germany may become a communistic state. That is possible. The 500,000 Hitler boys can change very quickly their arms. They love order, and communism gives order of a certain kind. They like organization, which communism provides.

If you wish to prevent the creation of a communistic Germany I foresee that you will be compelled to set up a committee of conservators, or a commission, as you say in this country, composed of representatives of the United Nations. To exclude representatives of the smaller nations, neighbors of Germany, on the ground that they would be revengeful, would be a mistake. It would justify the German idea of races of different value.

A strong army of occupation, formed by command of the United Nations, should hold all prominent places in Germany, so that the people would know, for the first time in 130 years, what a foreign authority looks like. Only with foreign faces, foreign uniforms, strange languages, and strange customs could they be brought to understand that they have been defeated. Nobody would be murdered or imprisoned, but they would feel, what they did not feel in 1919, that Poles and Jews, completely despised by the average German, are equal with them, and even their victors. If you send a strong united army into Germany for, say, the first 5 years, together with a commission of conservators of the United Nations, you may then nominate perhaps two dozen Germans from the concentration camps, or Niemollers, and possibly a radical emigrant or two, to share the foreign government. But in no case can you have a new Reichstag, with new liberals and socialists ready to turn into savage nationalistic militarists. Would you trust two watchdogs who lay quietly asleep while robbers went through your house?

I have heard the suggestion that Germany should be dismembered and broken into 20 to 30 pieces, as it was before Bismarck's time. That would be contrary to the ideas of our time. The nineteenth century witnessed the assembly of tribes into nations, and the German nation was created by Bismarck with the same great logic and the

same small errors as we note in the history of Italy, Greece, and other states.

But you can do something. As you know, the evil element of Germany comes from Prussia, and all the culture of Germany comes from the south and west. You can separate Germany, not into 30 pieces, but into 2. You can take away the old northeast Prussia plus the territory of the Junkers in Prussia. Then you would have a fairly free republic in Prussia, with about 25,000,000 inhabitants. Then take the rest of the country and form a federation, together with Austria, making about 50,000,000. I wrote a booklet, published only in French, on these lines, before the war. Some provinces like Saxony could decide by plebiscites to which of the two German republics they wished to belong. It would not be probable, because Prussia was hated in Germany and the Rhineland people called themselves "forced-Prussians" ("Muss-Preussen").

You would have two advantages in this plan. First, Prussia would be largely Lutheran, but the confederation would be preponderantly Catholic. Second, you would have two neighboring friendly republics, just as you have Canada and the United States living as neighbors and friends.

German culture, as you know, always came from the south and west. All the great names, in science, music, poetry, painting, and invention, all real glory of Germany is borne by men born in the south or west. No Prussian name of the first rank is known abroad in the intellectual or platonic world. But there are dozens of great men, from Luther, Kepler, and Gutenberg to Kant and Goethe; from Beethoven and Mozart to Schumann and Wagner; from Diesel and Roentgen to Einstein—all these, and many more, came from the south or west, or being Sachsen or Jews.

Austria, made up of 6,000,000 German-speaking Austrians, occupying one of the oldest parts of Germany, and forming part of the Reich for a thousand years until separated by Bismarck's Prussian ambition—Austria can never again become an independent republic or kingdom. The "anschluss" was the natural program of every German, of every party, and it was delayed only through fear of the victors in Versailles. Any revival of the outlived Hapsburg regime is as impossible as revival of the royal houses in Germany. The reasons? Well, it is against the spirit of our time to recreate, after the style of the Holy Alliance, any kingdoms which were destroyed, not by the Nazis, but in 1918 by the same victors who are to be victors tomorrow. Secondly, because not one of the more than 100 sons and grandsons of the dethroned German princes did anything to arouse the sympathy of the German people or to stir the imagination of the world. When young and older men and women became heroes and famous for their contributions to the fatherland, the German and Austrian princes remained in their castles or went abroad on insignificant missions. Only one or two were killed in the present war. The survivors, the pretenders, sat in the chancelleries of the European capitals or in the salons of Washington, to win the influence of important people or to marry rich girls. The decadence of these hundred German princes is a symbol that their time is over.

But we can revive some of their clever symbols with which to flatter the German common people. We should recreate titles and decorations, without which, in the Weimar Republic, they could not

live. Call a man who is saved from the concentration camp a "Freiheitsrat" and give him for his buttonhole a decoration in the shape of a silver-plated piece of barbed wire. He does not need it, but the Germans will look up to him and respect him more.

With such allied conservators and supervising educators in the first years of peace, and stripped of weapons, the German nation can be made a useful member of the European family. The Germans must come within the scope of the Atlantic Charter. They must retain their own German provinces. They are entitled to their own raw materials. They should have their factories working, their scientists and chemists at work, and their sports lovers at play; their music and industry is their own; they should share in the competition of the world.

Leave to the Germans all that the other nations have. But take away their weapons, supervise their education, and give them political guardianship, because they have shown the world that they are not able to govern themselves. If you do not do that, if you continue to speak, in the puritan sense, of the "poor misled German people," if you persist in trying to distinguish between Germans and Nazis, and write every day about battles against Nazis instead of Germans, then, within 20 years, your sons will sit around this oval table and write another declaration of war against Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ludwig. Now, we will begin to ask you a few questions.

We have a couple of professors, a couple of real good ones. The gentleman sitting at the end of the table is a distinguished professor, and we have a few more. When you are talking about a job to do over there, maybe we could send them over. Mr. Ludwig, what do you think?

Mr. LUDWIG. Every one around this table is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Rogers, I see you had made a few notes there.

Mrs. ROGERS. Professor Ludwig—

Mr. LUDWIG. I am not a professor. The professors are against me.

Mrs. ROGERS. Mr. Ludwig, I think it might interest you to know I made a protest on the floor of Congress against the persecution of minorities in Germany and the burning of your books, among others, by Hitler.

Mr. LUDWIG. In 1933; thank you very much.

Mrs. ROGERS. I think it was in 1933.

Mr. LUDWIG. On the 10th of May.

Mrs. ROGERS. If you would be interested I will send you a copy of my remarks.

Mr. LUDWIG. Would you be so kind?

Mrs. ROGERS. I have enjoyed very much the information you have given us and I felt from this side of the water undoubtedly what you say said was true. You could not separate the Nazis from many persons in the rest of Germany.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is right.

Mrs. ROGERS. We have a difficult task ahead of us after we win the war.

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mrs. ROGERS. If we are to follow out your suggestions.

Mr. LUDWIG. The difficulty always begins after the victory. Just like after the wedding.

Mrs. ROGERS. Some are very successful, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Eaton.

Dr. EATON. Mr. Ludwig, I would like to have you elaborate a little on your idea of the set-up of the German empire after the war. Do you propose to divide it into two groups, not to dismember the empire and have a half dozen groups according to religion or race, as has been proposed? You want the Prussians in one group and the rest of the Germans in the other?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Dr. EATON. You think you could create a federation of the other portions of Germany that would hold together?

Mr. LUDWIG. It did hold together after the defeat, even with Prussia.

Dr. EATON. It would hold with Prussia because Prussia is the holder.

Mr. LUDWIG. It was the idea from 1815 to 1867 to have a German federation or "Bund." It was there. It was weak. But it was weak because of trouble with the princes. The people were not against each other.

Dr. EATON. Now, what will you do with this East Prussia?

Mr. LUDWIG. East Prussia is an integral part of Prussia.

Dr. EATON. It is not geographically a part of Prussia? It is separated from the rest of the German territory by the Polish Corridor.

Mr. LUDWIG. The corridor made so much trouble for 20 years that no one wants to hear the name of corridor.

Dr. EATON. Are you going to shut Poland off from access to salt water?

Mr. LUDWIG. Not at all.

Dr. EATON. How will she reach it?

Mr. LUDWIG. Maybe a way will be found. It is a problem. But we are tired of it, and you, I think, are sick of the idea that the peace of the world should depend on Danzig and the corridor.

Dr. EATON. Of course, there are proposals to take the Prussians out of East Prussia and bring them across and turn the territory over to the Poles or Russians. You think it may be done?

Mr. LUDWIG. It may be done, provided there is protection for the minorities.

The CHAIRMAN. There are only a million and a half or 2,000,000 in that end of it.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is right.

Mr. EATON. What is the origin of the word "Junker"? What did that word connote? Who were the Junkers?

Mr. LUDWIG. They were the first barons and counts and great land-owners east of the Elbe, who protected their kings, and the kings gave them all power; because without them the kings were powerless, and they had the power to pull the kings down. Loyalty of the Junkers to their king has been for 400 years nothing more than cynicism and business.

Dr. EATON. So then they became the military leaders?

Mr. LUDWIG. From the time of the Great Elector in 1650, for 300 years the Junkers were the nucleus of an excellent military force. They enslaved the farmers all around them. Under Frederick the Great they forced the farmer to serve 30 years in the army. They

were allowed to go home 3 months every year because the king wanted new children, new soldiers. For 100 years most of the East Elbian farmers served virtually 30 years in the army.

Dr. EATON. In your proposed set-up of two new German countries would they have any freedom of trade? Would there be economic barriers of any kind?

Mr. LUDWIG. No; not an economic separation, only a political one. So, if in Prussia the old spirit would begin once more to create a new army, it would have no power to force all Germany to join.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chiperfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. If the Versailles Treaty was one of the main causes of this war, would you permit the same countries to be formed after this war, like Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Czechoslovakia? Would you have the same geographical boundaries as you had before the last war in Europe?

Mr. LUDWIG. That is a European question which depends on the Russian situation.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. But you would, if I understood you correctly, allow Germany to have the same boundaries as she had before the war?

Mr. LUDWIG. More or less the same as before this war. The chief problem is not territorial. The danger is if you give them freedom and liberty to govern themselves, they will make a new army and a new war. That you can prevent.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richards.

Mr. RICHARDS. Dr. Ludwig, I want to ask you a question or two about a few of the personalities in Germany. If Hitler were killed, as you have suggested, or assassinated, whom do you believe would take charge? Would it be Goering or Goebbels, or would it be a Junker like Von Papen?

Mr. LUDWIG. Who would be stronger at this moment, General Von Beck, or Brauchitsch, or Goering, I do not know, but the difference is not important. One is nearly as bad as the other. It is, excuse me, an American prejudice that a Prussian general could be touched by love of peace. Even the great Field Marshal Von Moltke wrote: "The eternal peace is a dream, and even not a sweet dream."

Mr. RICHARDS. The Junkers would immediately get into a scrap with the Hitler crowd, wouldn't they?

Mr. LUDWIG. Well, one of the aristocratic generals, as a prisoner in Russia, made the first statement against Hitler. General Von Thoma, as a prisoner from Africa, betrayed his Führer in the same way by a statement in London, which, thank God, by a mistake came into the press.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Ludwig, following this thought, if Hitler were assassinated and some general or generals put up a civilian as a stooge for us—you know what a stooge is?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes, yes.

Mr. VORYS. And made proposals for peace, for an armistice, that would be very plausible, how would we keep going? My concern is that if such a situation happened, you have an American people who would say "Well, all we are going ahead for is for revenge, and we do not want revenge." "What they say shows they have learned

their lesson and they want to rule themselves and be an orderly nation." The internal government of a country is no concern of ours. How are you going to make sure that we keep going in a military sense?

Mr. LUDWIG. Tell them the story of the Weimar Republic! Tell them Marshal Foch and General Pershing could not march to Berlin because the politicians hindered them. Tell them they went only to the Rhine. The victors left them free. You gave them full rein to govern themselves, and you saw where they arrived after 14 years.

Mr. VORYS. There would not be time to tell the American people this story if such a development happened. Wouldn't the answer be, "Well, all right, we will take our armies to Berlin and we will talk with you there." Would that be it?

Mr. LUDWIG. With whom?

Mr. VORYS. I do not know; whoever this new man is.

Mr. LUDWIG. There is no new man. There are only old men, the generals, and there are Communists, but there is no other man. There are some professors with good intentions, but without any power or influence. The German laughs at a professor who wants to govern, just as he laughs at a Prussian general who quotes Goethe. No German emigrant enjoys any authority at home, now or at any time. Carl Schurz, when he went back to Germany, was unknown to the masses. So was Bernstein. Germany is the only country in the world without a monument of a hero of liberty. There is no German analogy to great exiles like Mazzini, Kossuth, or Lenin. There does not exist a liberal German of any influence. That is the thesis which you have permitted me to develop today.

Mr. VORYS. Would you conceive this, that the Junkers themselves, if Hitler were assassinated, would put up a man like Niemoller for the purpose of convincing us and for camouflage?

Mr. LUDWIG. They will present you the devil or perhaps St. Paul. The Junker takes everyone he can use and will say, "Here is our Niemoller." But he would say, "No, gentlemen, not with you."

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Richards was asking what percentage of the German people are communistic now.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is impossible to say.

Mr. RICHARDS. At heart.

Mr. LUDWIG. They had, I think, about 5,000,000 votes the last time in 1932. But it is difficult to know what is today in their hearts, because communism changes and extreme nationalism changes. Both come very near together. Mr. Stalin went so much to the right that the salaries go from 3,000 to 70,000 rubels, and Mr. Hitler to the left. He is half a Communist, and nothing is more comic than his cry against communism.

Mrs. ROGERS. Will you yield for a question?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mrs. ROGERS. I thought it was the Nazi, or rather the German communistic ideas that got into Russia, which were responsible for the Russian revolution.

Mr. LUDWIG. In 1916 and 1917? I think the history of the Russian revolution shows the contrary. That Marx was a born German is no glory for and no culpability of the Germans. As a Jew he did not belong to the Germans, although he was, like many German Jews, much too patriotic.

Mr. JOHNSON. One question, please. What do you think is the explanation of the long silence of Hitler until recently, when he spoke again? Why is it?

Mr. LUDWIG. He is a madman. You cannot know why he is silent; and then he speaks too much. That is a question for a psychiatrist.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, doesn't he love to speak so well and hear his voice, and don't you think there might be some reason possibly to have him suppressed for awhile? For quite awhile there we heard nothing from him, until recently, and some seem to doubt now whether he is still alive.

Mr. LUDWIG. He is a Wagnerian; and in Wagnerian opera you hear the aria of King Marke in "Tristan" for 15 minutes—and then nothing.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is his intuition.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is the so-called intuition. I do not find it very important.

Mr. JOHNSON. I know it is unimportant, but was wondering what the reason could be.

Mr. LUDWIG. He spoke the other day.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. You spoke of the break-up of nerves of the German people. Do you think they are so constituted that they are more likely to break under a nervous strain than the British?

Mr. LUDWIG. Much more, because the British were bombarded 1 year and nobody broke down, or at least we did not see or hear of such a thing. The nation stood very strong. But we know that in Germany there is the most terrible anguish in their souls, their minds, and their nerves, because they were promised by Goering that bombs would never fall on them. Now, for 10 years, they have been under the strain and they have had war for 4 years. And for what? What is the Ukraine? The Germans have not the slightest interest in Russia. They never had war with Russia until 1914. The whole idea about the Ukraine is unpopular. The popular feeling in Germany only went to the Rhine and to Paris.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are looking for a break-down in morale in Germany?

Mr. LUDWIG. In 24 hours, when it comes. It will be more sudden than we expect. I do not know when. Nobody knows when. But you will have the reports, the headlines; the whole story within a week, and all will be over.

Mr. JOHNSON. A brainstorm?

Mr. LUDWIG. That is my deep conviction, after having studied the German character for 20 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Ludwig, I am very much impressed with your description of the German psychology and their devotion to order, their reverence of force, and their willingness to submit to force. Do you think that the wholesale military occupation of Germany, we will say with Allied troops on duty in every German city in possession of the city hall, would tend to bring them to their senses to the extent that they would not be quite so confident that they were the master race?

Mr. LUDWIG. If you give them another idea, another thing they can believe in. Communism is one of these other things. The Americans were very popular on the Rhine, as you know; the Frenchmen, no.

Frenchmen were never popular in Germany. That is an old story, going back 300 years. First the Germans thought of the American as a child. Then they said, "He is a good boy. You can speak with that man. He says 'Dankeschön.'" The American was much feared before he came, and it was an agreeable surprise, when he came in 1919, to find him so different from what they had pictured.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Would an extended occupation by foreign troops have any noticeable effect upon that German trend of thought?

Mr. LUDWIG. Not in 5 years. You have to have 50 years to bring about a real change. But you can have peace and prevent them from beginning another war.

Mr. WADSWORTH. You would not advocate a hasty solution of this thing as was attempted at Versailles?

Mr. LUDWIG. Was it so hasty at Versailles?

Mr. WADSWORTH. There was an attempt at Versailles to reorganize the world in 6 months, including the treatment of Germany.

Mr. LUDWIG. Oh, yes; that was too hasty.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Must we not go through more of a process of evolution?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes. But during this process Germany is there. You must do something with the sick man.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Sometimes soldiers of wide experience and long experience have a better vision than civilians at home.

Mr. LUDWIG. That is very true.

(Whereupon there was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. Right along the line Senator Wadsworth was speaking about, you began by saying, Mr. Ludwig, that in Germany the military predominated as against the intellectuals or against the bourgeoisie and in America you said just the opposite was true. That is, here the military is subordinated and the bourgeoisie is prominent. Now, isn't that opposite the psychology of the German people and can you ever root it out?

Mr. LUDWIG. No.

Mr. JONKMAN. You think it can never be rooted out?

Mr. LUDWIG. Well, I never say "never" in history. But you cannot change that within our time. To say "peace for our time" you must be as naive as a certain gentleman with an umbrella.

Mr. JONKMAN. Then Mr. Wadsworth's suggestion is that it should have an overwhelming, crushing defeat, something to at least stop it somewhat. If we had done that in 1918 then we might not have had quite the trouble we have had since.

Mr. LUDWIG. And yet the gentleman there predicted there would be some move here by those who would say, "Finish the story quickly." That would be the same error which was committed 25 years ago. My message is nothing else than to warn, because I know the German character. Let us not make this same mistake, about which General Pershing spoke to this gentleman; and the aide-de-camp of Foch told me the same thing.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JONKMAN. One additional question with reference to what you say, Mr. Ludwig, about the complete collapse of German morale, which, when it occurs, may come in 24 hours. And you also spoke about the bombardment or air attacks being the second front from above.

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do you think it can be brought about through that bombardment, or will it take an invasion of their territory to bring about the collapse?

Mr. LUDWIG. No invasion. A very important man in this country told me yesterday, "I do not believe in an invasion of Germany." He was right; it is not necessary. Germany will break down even when all its territory is free of enemies. It did so in 1918. And now they have an enormous invasion from the air, which was not the case in 1918. A frontal invasion would be as difficult as it would be unnecessary, at least from the west. If the German people see an enemy on the Rhine they will perhaps regain their fighting mood. But their enemy can stay in southern France, or Italy, or wherever you like, and yet they will break down, because the nervous tension is stronger. As the German soldier has more courage than imagination, he succumbs more easily to the invisible enemy than to the soldiers he would meet in hand-to-hand combat on the Rhine. Napoleon—I do not want to insult him by comparison with Mr. Hitler—Napoleon, as you know, broke down in the eleventh year, and now this is the eleventh year of Mr. Hitler.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Ludwig, bearing on what you are speaking about, we were told at a meeting we had here some time ago by the then American Minister, I think in Luxembourg, that the time Hess flew to England there was panic in Germany for several days.

Mr. LUDWIG. Maybe.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. And that there was a feeling that everything was over. I just mention that because it bears on what you say, that one of these days a break-down is coming and it will come fast when it does come.

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. May I just ask a question there? Did I understand you to say, Mr. Ludwig, that there should be no invasion of German territory by any of the troops?

Mr. LUDWIG. It is not "verboden" to do it. I did not mean that. But if you have Italy in your hands, and that is no longer a long way off, and if you have an enormous bombardment over Germany, with more and more material from America, and the situation as you have it in Africa, you will find the feeling in Germany will be, "The game is lost. Why fight 10 years longer to defend Germany?" They did not defend Germany for even 1 day the last time.

The CHAIRMAN. How are we going to get our troops into Germany if there is not an invasion?

Mr. VORYS. There would be a collapse, and you would have an army of occupation and not an invasion.

Mr. LUDWIG. Occupation.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Ludwig, you expressed, I think, some fear that the people of this country did not recognize the psychology of the German people for what it is worth, and that perhaps opinion here would be too soft when the time came to make a peace. That is your general thought, isn't it, that the American people or this Government might be too easy in making a peace, and thus permit Germany to build up again and have another war?

Mr. LUDWIG. This Government in no case; but the people.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What do you think about the European countries in the same respect? Do they know better than we know?

Mr. LUDWIG. That I do not know. But an eminent Englishman I spoke to the other day, an important member of the embassy, smiled at my suggestion that the English could give in to the generals and Junkers. He said, "We learned something from the first time. In England nobody will make any peace with any military follower of Mr. Hitler."

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you think European countries feel it will be a great mistake to give Germany any opportunity at all to remain a great nation?

Mr. LUDWIG. What is a great nation? An armed nation? Then you are right. But if a great nation is a nation that is as productive as Germany aside from its armies, then I would say, they can remain a great nation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But can you have a great nation in Germany economically without them building up a great army, unless you maintain a force there to stop them from building that army?

Mr. LUDWIG. This force is what I call the occupation army.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that will have to be there for many, many years.

Mr. LUDWIG. X number of years.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think a federation of these small states around Germany would be a fairly effective barrier to Germany again becoming a great militaristic nation?

Mr. LUDWIG. That is what Mr. Churchill said the other day.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A sort of federation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and perhaps Austria and even of a portion of Germany?

Mr. LUDWIG. That's about what he said 3 days ago.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Oh, he did?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Don't you think the only practical way for supervising Germany depends upon an international organization where that burden is borne by all of the United Nations?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This policy over a number of years of supervising Germany, isn't that dependent upon organization on a world scale for that purpose?

Mr. LUDWIG. Of course.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is, you do not expect the United States individually to undertake that job?

Mr. LUDWIG. We would have the United States take part in Europe. Mr. Churchill, for example, spoke only regarding Europe.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, I do not follow you quite, there. I said a world organization. You conceive only of a European federation?

Mr. LUDWIG. Mr. Churchill's idea is European. Other people's idea is a world organization.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is your idea? Don't you care to give us your idea?

Mr. LUDWIG. A world organization was always my ideal. Twenty years ago I wrote that which you say here, in 1922 or 1923.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If you had such a world organization for that purpose with regard to force, then it might well be a practical thing

for that organization to supervise Germany or any other country. That may be for Japan likewise.

Mr. LUDWIG. Of course, but you cannot do it at once. You cannot do it in the first year.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no, that is a permanent thing. There can be no consistent international policy, we have already found, without an organization to attach that policy to.

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You mentioned Churchill's idea of a European federation. As a matter of fact, don't you think in such a federation Russia will be inclined to control that rather than England, and that we would run a very great danger of permitting the organization of a European federation or some organization other than a world federation? Either we have to go our old road of every nation for itself or a world federation without any in-between federation for Europeans. That would be very dangerous, wouldn't it, because of the preponderance of Russia?

Mr. LUDWIG. Not only for this reason, but there are twenty other reasons why it would be dangerous.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is one very great reason?

Mr. LUDWIG. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And that it seems to me in the course of time would inevitably lead to the domination by Russia of all of that federation; but it might be controlled if it is part of a world federation in which all of the nations participate. That is the difference.

Mr. LUDWIG. Is it your fear that the Russians will carry communism into Germany?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the absence of any larger organization to control this, I think so. I think in the absence of that that will inevitably come. Don't you think that is a problem, at least?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the risk we have to run if we permit that to go along in that way.

Mr. LUDWIG. In any case if there is an army of occupation in the beginning you have a much stronger voice in Europe than you would have without soldiers. Is that not so?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Ludwig, personally I want to thank you for your appearance before our committee, and the very able statement that you have made concerning a subject about which you are so well informed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ludwig, I want to express the appreciation of the committee for the very interesting and informative statement you have made here today. It is indeed a pleasure for us to have heard you speak personally on a subject with which you are so familiar, and the information you have given us is going to prove very helpful to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Whereupon the hearing was closed.)

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